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Constance Backhouse*

Turning the Tables on RDS: Racially
Revealing Questions Asked by White
Judges

In the 1997 RDS case, the Supreme Court of Canada deliberated on the concept of
judicial race bias. The decision subjected the oral ruling of a lower court trial judge
in a busy Youth Court to close scrutiny. The majority of the nine-person, all-white
bench reprimanded Canada’s first Black female judge, whose words about police
officers who “overreact” in dealing with racialized youth they found “troubling”
and “worrisome.” This article places the same close scrutiny on the words of the
white judges who were most critical of the trial judge. It examines their informal
interjections and comments at the Supreme Court oral hearing. Making use of the
appellate transcript and video-recording of the oral argument, it concludes that the
informal comments of the top court judges exemplified many of the patterns that
anti-racist educators describe as indicative of a lack of understanding of racism.

Dans l’affaire RDS de 1997, la Cour suprême du Canada a délibéré sur le concept
de partialité raciale judiciaire. La décision a soumis à un examen minutieux la
décision prononcée oralement par une juge de première instance dans un tribunal
pour adolescents très fréquenté. La majorité des neuf juges, tous de race blanche,
ont réprimandé la première juge de race noire au Canada, dont les propos sur les
agents de police qui « réagissent de façon excessive » lorsqu’ils traitent avec des
jeunes racialisés ont été jugés « inquiétants ». Le présent article examine avec
la même attention les propos des juges blancs qui ont le plus critiqué la juge de
première instance. Il examine leurs interjections et commentaires informels lors
de l’audience de la Cour suprême. S’appuyant sur la transcription de l’appel et
l’enregistrement vidéo de la plaidoirie, il conclut que les commentaires informels des
juges de la Cour suprême illustrent bon nombre des modèles que les éducateurs
antiracistes décrivent comme révélateurs d’un manque de compréhension du
racisme.

*
Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. This article is part of a larger project: a full book on the
RDS case. I am indebted to Sylvia Rich and Stefanie Carsley for suggesting this article, and to Sylvia,
Holland Stille, Mirsa Duka, Diana Majury, and Diana Backhouse for helping me think it through.
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Introduction
RDS v The Queen is the most significant case on judicial race bias in
Canadian history.1 In 1994, Canada’s first Black female judge, Corrine
Sparks, acquitted a Black male teenager in the Youth Justice Court in
Halifax, while remarking on the overreaction of police in their dealings
with non-white youth. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada probed
the words of her oral judgment so closely that even the Crown lawyer
suggested that “we may be analyzing it in more depth” than “some of
the words might deserve.”2 Ultimately, six of the nine justices on the allwhite Supreme Court upheld Judge Sparks’ decision to acquit.3 But two
of the judges in the majority, Justices Cory and Iacobucci, found that her
“unfortunate” and “troubling” comments “were worrisome and came
very close to the line.”4 Three others—Chief Justice Lamer and Justices
Sopinka and Major—dissented, concluding that her words went over
the line, raising a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to warrant
quashing Judge Sparks’ decision.5 Significantly, that meant the majority

1.
R v RDS, [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [RDS].
2.
Supreme Court of Canada Appeal Transcript, RDS v Her Majesty the Queen Supreme Court
of Canada, Library and Archives Canada RG 125, vol 5231, file 25063A [Appeal Transcript], Oral
Argument, Robert E. Lutes, at 66.
3.
Justices McLachlin, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, La Forest, Cory, and Iacobucci.
4.
RDS, supra note 1 at 543-545.
5.
Ibid at 500.
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of the judges on the top court found that her reflections on white racism
were improper.
What if the tables were turned? What if the white Supreme Court
judges’ questions and interjections in the courtroom hearing for the
RDS appeal were given the same scrutiny for racial bias? Chief Justice
Antonio Lamer’s comments became notorious after his remarks provoked
a Canadian Judicial Council complaint.6 But a fuller examination of the
words he and Justices Major and Sopinka uttered in the open courtroom
offers a window into the minds of some of those tasked with ruling on
racial bias. When judges freely articulate their thoughts in an in-person
oral hearing, it can do more than foreshadow the ultimate decision. The
off-the-cuff discussion can be quite different from formalized decisions
written months later. The type of scrutiny one gives to a trial judge’s oral
decision may find a better analogue in appellate judges’ questions and
remarks in the hearing, rather than their heavily edited judgments. When
the focus pivots away from Judge Sparks, to scrutinize the Supreme Court
judges’ spoken words, it is very revealing.
I should clarify that I self-identify as a white Canadian. While I hope
to challenge the thinking that comes from white privilege, I do not want
to suggest that I am free from the pervasive racism that generations of
white Canadians have displayed. I acknowledge that it is easier to spot
it in others, and I do not wish to suggest that the Supreme Court justices
were not exemplary judges or persons in other respects. I am unsure
whether I would have done substantially better in 1997, had I been a judge
questioning the RDS counsel. The author of So You Want to Talk About
Race, Ijeoma Oluo, emphasizes that upending centuries-old systems of
racism “is not an easy fix.” 7 The author of White Fragility, Robin DiAngelo,
writes that “racism is deeply complex and nuanced, and given this, we can
never consider our learning to be complete or finished.” 8 Ibram X Kendi
compares it to “fighting an addiction,” noting that “being an antiracist
requires persistent self-awareness, constant self-criticism, and regular
self-examination.”9 I think we should take up the challenge to engage in
an ongoing exercise to come to grips with our own racism. Anti-racist
activists have urged white people to examine how our white institutions
and whiteness bolster racism. Oluo, DiAngelo, Kendi, and Reni EddoLodge have offered important theoretical and structural frameworks for
6.
Letter from the Chinese Canadian National Council to the Canadian Judicial Council (28
October 1997). For fuller discussion, see below.
7.
Ijeoma Oluo, So You Want to Talk About Race (New York: Seal Press, 2019) at 7.
8.
Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility (Boston: Beacon Press, 2018) at xv.
9.
Ibram X Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist (New York: One World, 2019) at 23.
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the inquiry.10 Their insights allow us to examine the RDS case from a new
perspective and help emphasize why our judges (and all of us non-judges)
must expand our understanding of the fullness of racism.
“Race” is a fiction, a socially-constructed myth that purports to divide
human beings into distinct categories. The fictional classifications and
terminologies have changed over time and place. “How the Irish Became
White” is one of the most revealing of book titles, but others historically
differentiated from the “white” category include English working-class
communities, Jews, Muslims, French-Canadians, Indo-Canadians,
Central Europeans, Eastern Europeans, Asians, and Indigenous peoples.
Significantly, people already seen as “white” decided who was “white.”11
This is why many anti-racist theorists describe “race” in scare
quotes. It is why we refer to “racialized” people, to signify that “race”
is a fiction, but racism is a pernicious reality. In this article, which deals
with specific geographic settings and times, I have chosen to step beyond
the complexities of race definitions. Following the self-identification of
the individuals involved and for ease of reference, I shall make use of
simplified descriptors for the actors as “white” or “Black.” 12
The article begins with a description of the RDS case and the trial
decision of Judge Corrine Sparks. It then turns to the oral hearing of the
appeal before the nine white judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.
It considers the hypothetical questions Chief Justice Lamer put to the
lawyers, and the ensuing complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council (later
dismissed) that accused him of embracing racial stereotypes. The article
analyzes the context within which the judges operated: a professional
legal culture of whiteness and a tradition of deference that impedes calling
white judges on their racism. Lastly, it examines the words and phrases
of the three dissenting judges—Chief Justice Lamer and Justices Major
and Sopinka—whose ruling was the most scathing about Judge Sparks’
comments concerning police officers. This inquiry may help discern some
of the patterns that white judges exhibit in discussions about racism.

10. Oluo, supra note 7; DiAngelo, supra note 8; Kendi, supra note 9; Reni Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No
Longer Talking to White People About Race (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).
11. Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995); Nell Irvin Painter,
The History of White People (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010); Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded:
A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900–1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
12. The New York Times explains that it capitalizes Black when it describes people and cultures of
African origin, because it signifies a race and a culture rather than a colour. Nancy Coleman, “Why
We’re Capitalizing Black”, New York Times (5 July 2020), online <www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/
insider/capitalized-black.html> [perma.cc/E5YY-46NQ].
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I. The RDS Case: A Brief Summary
The trial began in the Youth Justice Court in Halifax, Nova Scotia
(“Youth Court”) on 2 December 1994.13 The courtroom configuration was
apparently unprecedented in Canada: a Black accused (Rodney Darren
Small), a Black defence lawyer (Burnley “Rocky” Jones), a Black court
reporter (Marva Welch), a Black deputy sheriff (Ray Lawrence), and a
Black judge (Corrine E Sparks). The only two white people in the room
were the arresting officer (Constable Donald Stienburg) and the Crown
prosecutor (Richard B Miller).14
There were just two witnesses: Rodney Small and Constable Stienburg.
Rodney Small testified that on 17 October 1993, he rode his bike past
the scene of an arrest in a predominantly Black Halifax neighbourhood.
Fifteen-year-old Rodney knew the Black boy in handcuffs; he was a cousin.
Rodney testified that he rode up close to the white police officer who was
arresting his cousin, and came to a halt straddling his bike. Rodney called
out to his cousin, “What’s wrong? What happened?” Although Constable
Donald Stienburg testified that Rodney drove the bike into his legs,
Rodney denied that his bike was touching the officer. Rodney testified that
the officer warned him to “shut up,” or he would be arrested next. Instead,
Rodney said he had shouted to his cousin, “Do you want me to go tell your
mother?” The officer testified that in an altercation that lasted for “a couple
of seconds,” Rodney yelled at him and pushed him with his shoulders and
hands. Rodney insisted that his hands were still on the handlebars and
denied hitting the officer.15
Both agreed that the bike was not travelling at great speed, and that
the officer was not knocked over. Both agreed that Rodney never got off
his bike. Both agreed that Officer Stienburg grabbed Rodney while he was
still straddling his bike, and placed Rodney and his cousin simultaneously
in chokeholds.16 Rodney was arrested and charged with assaulting a police
officer, assaulting a police officer with intent to prevent the lawful arrest
of another person, and obstruction of a police officer.17

13. RDS v Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, Library and Archives Canada RG 125,
vol 5231, file 25063A [Trial Transcript].
14. James W St G Walker, “A Black Day in Court: ‘Race’ and Judging in R v RDS” in Barrington
Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey: Historical Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2012). Due to his age, the Young Offenders Act prohibited the publication of Rodney Small’s
name; the case is styled “R.D.S.” Subsequently, he gave his permission to disclose his full name.
Interview with Rodney D Small (14 August 2018) in Halifax.
15. Trial Transcript, supra note 13.
16. Ibid.
17. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 270(1)(a)(b), 129(a).
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The disparities in age and physical stature between Constable
Stienburg and Rodney Small were striking. The twenty-nine-year-old
officer, a veteran of the SWAT team, stood more than six feet tall with a
heavy-set athletic physique.18 Younger-looking than his age, Rodney was
five-foot-eight and “105 pounds soaking wringing wet.” 19 The lawyer
who defended Rodney called the charges “bogus,” overkill from a police
force intent on teaching a young Black teenager not to interfere with an
officer of the law.20
Unlike higher courts, where judges often reserve their judgments
to give themselves time to consider their reasons, judges in the hectic Youth
Court deliver oral rulings immediately after trial. In her oral judgment,
Judge Sparks emphasized that the burden of proof was “squarely placed
upon the Crown [to] prove all the elements of the offence beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Because Rodney’s handcuffed cousin no longer posed
any “threat to the officer,” she wondered why Constable Stienburg would
be “threatened by another young person who was merely trying to assist
his friend in a non-threatening manner?” Although she stressed that she
did not accept “everything” Rodney had said in court, she noted that he
“seemed to be a rather honest young boy” who said “quite openly on
cross-examination he was being nosey.” She observed that the officer
“gave the Court the distinct impression that he had a rather difficult job
in trying to restrain” the cousin, but had failed to mention that the boy
was in handcuffs when Rodney arrived. “[W]hat was the big ordeal?” she
added, “It’s a teenager, young person.” Counsel had not cited any of the
multiple reports documenting disparate treatment of racialized individuals
within the criminal justice system, and Judge Sparks made no mention of
these, but she concluded that Rodney’s testimony had “raised a doubt in
my mind” about what transpired. She dismissed all three charges. 21 Her
next words had explosive consequences:
I’m not saying that the Constable has misled the court, although police
officers have been known to do that in the past. I am not saying that the
officer overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, particularly
when they are dealing with non-white groups. That to me, indicates a
18. Interview with Donald Stienburg (28 September 2018) in Halifax.
19. Interview with Rodney Small, supra note 14; Walker, supra note 14 at 439.
20. Interview with Rodney Small, supra note 14.
21. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 80-93. In Supplementary Reasons she issued after the
conclusion of the trial, Judge Sparks made her first reference to the Royal Commission on the Donald
Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989). The appellate courts ruled her
Supplementary Reasons invalid because they were not issued during the trial, but after the court
was no longer seized with the case. For further discussion of the Marshall Inquiry and other studies
disclosing race disparities in the criminal justice system, see below.
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state of mind right there that is questionable. I believe that probably the
situation in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who
overreacted. I do accept the evidence of R.D.S. that he was told to shut
up or he would be under arrest. That seems to be in keeping with the
prevalent attitude of the day. 22

Although the word “racist” had never been said, the white officer
believed that Judge Sparks had called him a racist.23 His complaint,
supported by the white police chief and the white Crown prosecutor, set
in motion a chain of appeals that led to the Supreme Court of Canada.24
The Supreme Court hearing on 10 March 1997 involved an
unprecedented number of Black lawyers. 25 Just two of the lawyers were
white. Robert E Lutes QC represented the Crown and Dalhousie law
professor Dianne Pothier appeared on behalf of Rodney Small. Rodney’s
other lawyer was Burnley “Rocky” Jones, one of Canada’s foremost
Black anti-racist activists.26 Yola Grant and Carol Allen, Black lawyers
from Toronto, represented two intervener women’s groups.27 Black lawyer
April Burey represented three Black intervener groups.28 The courtroom
was jam-packed with Black observers who had arrived to bear witness to
the historic case. Due to space limitations, most of the non-Blacks had
moved to an overflow room, offering their seats to the Black observers. 29
The courtroom had become another version of the earlier Halifax Youth
Court hearing. The difference this time was the all-white bench of judges.
What must the Supreme Court judges have thought that morning, as
they looked out on so many Black lawyers and observers? Their days were
typically spent listening to an all-white cast of lawyers, members of their
own racial group, in a racial context deemed normal or neutral in legal
circles. Had they seen such a large Black assemblage in their courtroom
before? Did they recognize that they were experiencing a rare moment
in which the whiteness of their professional world had been displaced in
22. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 80-93.
23. Interview with Donald Stienburg, supra note 18.
24. Interview with Rick Miller (17 August 2018) in Halifax; Eva Hoare, “Halifax Police Chief to
complain about remarks from judge,” Halifax Chronicle-Herald (13 December 1994).
25. Six Black lawyers and articling students were seated at the counsel tables: Burnley “Rocky”
Jones, Yola Grant, Carol Allen, April Burey, Jewel Amoah, and Douglas Johnson. The first five argued
in support of Judge Sparks’ decision; the sixth was an articling student with the Crown Attorney.
26. Burnley “Rocky” Jones & James W St G Walker, Burnley “Rocky” Jones: Revolutionary (Black
Point, Nova Scotia: Roseway/Fernwood, 2016).
27. The Women’s Legal and Education Action Fund, and the National Organization of Immigrant
and Visible Minority Women of Canada; Interview with Yola Grant (22 March 2018) in Toronto;
Interview with Carol Allen (31 May 2018) in Meaford, Ontario.
28. The African Canadian Legal Clinic and the Afro-Canadian Caucus of Nova Scotia.
29. Interview with Lynn Jones (4 June 2018) in Halifax.
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some respect? Did they find it novel? Did they find it unsettling? Would
any of this affect their judgment?
II. The most egregious example, Chief Justice Lamer: Honkies, frogs,
Chinese gamblers, and Gypsies
In order to highlight the comments voiced by the Supreme Court judges
at the hearing, their words will be italicized except where it is obvious
that it is a quotation because the passage is offset by an indentation. Chief
Justice Antonio Lamer, who found Sparks’ words so biased that he would
have sent the case back for a new trial, interjected during the hearing
with statements that were widely understood as racially problematic. The
Francophone judge from Quebec cut off the lawyers’ submissions to say,
“To some people I’m a honky, to others I am a frog. …Am I to say that…an
English policeman arresting a French Canadian, that we take into account
that there are social tensions right now and factor them into every case?”30
At first, general laughter greeted the references to “honky” and “frog,”
perhaps because Lamer CJ was referring to himself. To growing discomfort
in the courtroom, he then referred to Chinese clients from his earlier law
practice. The court’s video recording shows Chief Justice Lamer shifting
his gaze from the lawyers to scan the room. 31 Beside him on the bench,
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé rolled her eyes and swivelled in her chair
with displeasure. 32
Lamer CJ continued, “For many, many years when I was practising as
a lawyer, I had clients who were Chinese and the Chinese were very much
into gambling and they are tremendous gamblers.” He added, “actually—
there is a problem right now in Montreal [with] the casinos on Terre des
Hommes.” In an apparent attempt at humour, he added that he could take
“judicial cognizance” of this because “I didn’t go to the casino, I read it
in the papers.” He remarked that “the casino is constantly occupied by
people of the Chinese community” and emphasized that “Chinese people
have a propensity for gambling.” As captured in the video, he continued:
Now, can I take that into account if a Chinese is accused of [pause] I
don’t know, some illegal gambling, which is not an awful crime, but
30. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 10-12. Dictionaries describe “honky” as a derogatory term
used by Blacks to describe whites.
31. Video recording of the oral argument, filed with the Supreme Court of Canada. Laugher is
evident only after the first two references. The growing discomfort was mentioned in the Interview
with Yola Grant, supra note 27; Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29; Interview with Chantal Tie
(30 July 2018) in Ottawa; Interview with Michelle Williams (5 June 2018) in Halifax.
32. On Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s pivot, see Interview with Yola Grant, supra note 27. On the strains
between the two judges, see Constance Backhouse, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2017).
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anyway some illegal gambling? [smile] Can I factor in that, well, he’s
Chinese, he says he wasn’t gambling and the police officer is—ah, is
ah—well, he’s a non-Chinese, and can I factor this in, or start factoring
in the fact that the non-Chinese police officer might have a bias against
Chinese people? I understand your argument, and it is a fascinating one,
but I am just trying to figure out how far down the slope we’re going to
go once we do this?33

Rodney Small’s counsel, Dianne Pothier, diplomatically did not
point out that Lamer CJ had just supported a negative stereotype about a
racialized minority. But his conjecture was not parallel to Judge Sparks’
comments. He referred to an entire racialized group. Judge Sparks referred
to an institutional culture of a specific group of adults in a particular
occupation.
Chief Justice Lamer continued to speculate. With his reference to the
Roma, whom he mislabelled “gypsies,” he further reinforced negative and
racist stereotypes:
But what if I take judicial notice of the fact that 95 per cent – and I’m
saying this and I have no facts, and I wouldn’t want to offend that
community, but that 95 per cent of gypsies are pick pockets and it’s like
the Marshall Inquiry, and we have that data, and I am dealing with a pick
pocket here and assessing the policeman’s credibility. Of course, it is the
accused and I have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt…but can
I factor in this judicial notice I have – and I’m not saying that that’s a
fact.34

Still later, he added, “What, ah, what if we, we, there is empirical data
to the effect that a certain ethnic group doesn’t have great respect for the
oath?”35
Sitting in the courtroom behind the lawyers, Black anti-racist activist
Lynn Jones recalled thinking, “Oh My God. [T]he man’s so racist, so
blatantly racist. How can he be sitting on the Supreme Court?”36 Asian
lawyer Chantal Tie, observing from the overflow room, was equally
“appalled.”37 Black lawyer Michelle Williams was disheartened, wondering

33. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 20-21. The “Terre des Hommes” reference is audible in the
video, but the court reporter missed it, and the transcript refers to a single casino in Montreal. The
pause and smile, neither captured in the transcript, are evident in the video.
34. Ibid at 23.
35. Ibid at 24. For further discussion of the Marshall Inquiry, see below.
36. Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29.
37. Interview with Chantal Tie, supra note 31 (co-chair of the legal committee of the intervener
LEAF).
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“What kind of decision can you expect…when the Chief Justice makes
racist comments?”38
Chief Justice Lamer’s questions prompted the Chinese Canadian
National Council (CCNC) and twenty other social-justice organizations
to file a formal complaint with the Canadian Judicial Council. The groups
claimed that when he had described the Chinese “propensity to gamble”
as a “matter of fact,” he demonstrated an inadequate appreciation of
racism. They noted that the false stereotype about Chinese gambling and
criminality, rooted in the nineteenth-century terror of a “yellow peril,”
had culminated in racist head taxes and the Chinese Exclusion Act. In
their letter to the Canadian Judicial Council, the CCNC addressed their
concerns with Lamer CJ’s reasoning:
By putting forward examples of racial stereotype to counter the
argument that judges should be made aware of the reality of racism,
the Chief Justice’s reasoning is reflective of a lack of understanding of
what racism is all about. Racism is about the formation and promotion
of stereotypes of racialized communities by those in power in order to
justify discriminatory practices and laws. Judges who acknowledge and
challenge racism will also have to acknowledge and challenge racial
stereotypes. But when judges begin to embrace racial stereotypes as facts
about certain racialized communities, then serious questions must be
raised about the ability of our judiciary to deliver judgement in an evenhanded manner, particularly when it comes to racial minority groups.39

A spokesperson for the Roma Advocacy Centre stated it also “had a
problem with Lamer’s statements, even if they were just oral arguments.”40
The complaint suggested that Chief Justice Lamer should acknowledge
that his comments had hurt Canadian racialized communities, that he
should apologize, and that all the Supreme Court judges should undergo
anti-racism training.41
Robin DiAngelo’s White Fragility has reviewed the responses that
we, as whites, often display when faced with complaints about racist
behavior: anger, argumentation, defensiveness, emotional incapacitation,
withdrawal, and cognitive dissonance.42 Lamer CJ responded with anger
when the Toronto Star covered the complaint.43 In what the press described
38. Interview with Michelle Williams, supra note 31.
39. Letter from the CCNC to the Canadian Judicial Council (28 October 1997).
40. “Antonio Lamer: Judge Referred to Chinese as ‘Tremendous Gamblers,’” Toronto Star (4
November 1997), digital version retrieved with Factiva, Inc., no page number.
41. Letter CCNC to CJC, supra note 39.
42. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 68, 101.
43. The printed version of the article appeared as Dale Anne Freed, “Top Judge Accused of
‘Stereotyping,’” Toronto Star (4 November 1997) A25. The digital version, with the same date &
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as “a spirited written response to The Star,” he called the criticism
“outrageous” (emphasis in the Star article).44 The outrage of the racialized
people who sat in his courtroom and the members of the social justice
organizations who complained was reframed as his outrage over their
critique of him. Lamer CJ argued that his reference to former Chinese
clients was past history, although he insisted it was also a depiction of
reality:
At the time I was practising law in the late ‘50s-early ‘60s, there were
some Chinese men (Canada had unfair laws at the time as regards the
immigration of Chinese women) who were very much into gambling.
This is a fact. It is unfortunate that I used the expression “they are
tremendous gamblers” as I was referring to the situation at that time.
Today the profile of the Chinese community in Montreal is completely
different. If I have offended the Chinese community by a slip of the
tongue, by the use of “are” instead of “were,” I offer my apologies.45
(emphasis in the original.)

Taking refuge in “that was then, this is now” is another common
position for those who respond to complaints of racism.46 The Chief
Justice insisted that his past assessment was “a fact” at the same time as
he minimized the impact of the Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the most
egregious racist statutes in Canadian history, which had barred Chinese
women and men from immigrating to Canada between 1923 and 1947.47
The word slippage between “were” and “are” makes clear how intertwined
the past and the present remained. His remarks about Chinese gambling
in the Montreal casino were all phrased in the present tense: “there is a
problem right now in Montreal,” “the casino is constantly occupied by
people of the Chinese community,” and “Chinese people have a propensity
for gambling.” 48 (emphasis added.)

headline, omits Freed’s byline, and contains three more paragraphs than in the print version. The
additional digital material noted that Lamer CJ was one of three dissenting judges, that the Roma
Advocacy Centre had a problem with his statements, and that the National Action Committee on the
Status of Women wanted him to step down.
44. Nicolaas Van Rijn, “Chief Justice Denies Attack on Chinese”, Toronto Star (5 November 1997)
A8.
45. Ibid.
46. Paul Thomas offers one typical illustration: “I didn’t own slaves, and slavery ended in the
1800s.” “Confronting White Responses to Racism: De-centering Whiteness and White Fragility” (16
June 2020), online: Medium <medium.com/an-injustice/confronting-white-responses-to-racism-decentering-whiteness-and-white-fragility-a9362195d8b4> [perma.cc/79WC-R58U]. DiAngelo, supra
note 8 at 22 notes that “many whites see racism as a thing of the past.”
47. Backhouse, supra note 11.
48. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 20-21.
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The Chief Justice’s reference to “a slip of the tongue” minimized his
comment, another common pattern of defensive argumentation, as did
the apology that began, “If I have offended…” It was not a question of
“if.” In his letter to the Star Lamer CJ insisted that “I did not mean any
offence,” later stressing that “It was not in the least intended to offend any
group.” Such statements are sometimes accepted as an honest and sincere
response.49 Yet the courts had long ago drawn a distinction between intent
and harmful impact in anti-discrimination law.50 The law had also made
finely tuned distinctions between intent, honest mistake, wilful blindness,
negligence, accident, and incapacity to form intent. Did the Chief Justice
stop to think about which of the various classifications might apply to him
before mounting his defence?
Lamer CJ was on somewhat stronger ground when he defended his
remarks as “purely hypothetical examples of stereotypes, not factual
assertions.” 51 When the lawyer Yola Grant expressed concern that he based
his assumption of a racialized gambling propensity upon his law practice
experience, he was quick to reply “It was a hypothetical.”52 It was a point
Lamer CJ made several times in the courtroom.53 In his letter to the Star,
he added, “I put to (the lawyer) various hypothetical stereotypes for the
sake of argument, to express my distaste for such stereotypes and to point
out what I felt was a flaw in her reasoning.”54 Jonas Ma, the executive
director of the CCNC, responded that Lamer had missed the point: “Even
giving hypothetical examples of stereotypes can reinforce racist images,”
he explained. 55
The Toronto Star was alarmed by Chief Justice Lamer’s anger. When
a staff reporter phoned him that evening, Lamer CJ apparently tried to
alleviate some concern. “Let’s start by saying I don’t intend to sue
anybody,” he quipped.56 The Star not only accepted the Chief Justice’s
49. One generous example of this came from Chris Rock, well-known African-American actor and
comedian, in answer to a question about his reaction to Jimmy Fallon’s earlier appearance in blackface
on Saturday Night Live. As quoted in Dave Itzkoff, “Chris Rock Tried to Warn Us,” New York Times
(20 September 2020) AR6, Rock said: “I’m friends with Jimmy. Jimmy’s a great guy. And he didn’t
mean anything. A lot of people want to say intention doesn’t matter, but it does.”
50. “A central trend in the development of discrimination law, in every jurisdiction, has been the
movement from a requirement of intention to ground a complaint to the recognition as actionable
of indirect or adverse effect discrimination.” Denise G. Réaume, “Harm and Fault in Discrimination
Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001) 2:1 Theor Inq L 349.
51. Van Rijn, supra note 44.
52. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2.
53. Ibid at 24: “I’m just pretending for—it’s a hypothetical.”
54. Van Rijn, supra note 44.
55. Ibid.
56. Don Sellar, “How the Chief Justice’s Side of the Story Got Mangled,” Toronto Star (8 November
1997) E2. The staff reporter represented the Star’s “Bureau of Accuracy.”
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excuse that he was “actually giving examples of how wrong stereotyping
would be,” but also it published an apology on 5 November 1997. The
paper’s white Ombudsperson, Don Sellar, wrote a column describing
Lamer as “under attack by the Chinese Canadian National Council and
20 other ethnocultural groups.” It was a replication of the RDS case itself,
in which the white officer had turned the questionable arrest of a Black
youth into a “racist” attack upon himself. It distracted from the harms of
racism and served as an example of what some anti-racist educators refer
to as “white-centering.”57 Sellar affirmed Chief Justice Lamer’s words as
spoken “hypothetically, the way judges often do when they test lawyers’
arguments,” and depicted the Chief Justice as “the victim of a journalistic
mugging.”58 The column was an illustration of the backlash that so often
greets complaints of racism.
The phrase “journalistic mugging” seems overblown. The original
article had simply stated:
Lamer is under attack for calling the Chinese “tremendous gamblers”
during an appeal before the Supreme Court last March 10. Lamer said
he was using hypothetical comments when he stated in court that over
the years many of his clients were Chinese and were “very much into
gambling.” Later on in the hearing, according to excerpts from a transcript
of the appeal, Lamer also took shots at another group: “What if I take
judicial notice of the fact that 95 per cent of gypsies are pickpockets?” 59

The rest of the article consisted of statements from the aggrieved groups
that accurately represented their newsworthy concerns.60 The reporter’s
phrase “took shots” was the one journalistic assessment, tempered with
the qualification of “hypothetical comments.” 61
Undeterred by the media backlash, the CCNC pressed its complaint
forward to the Canadian Judicial Council, which was composed of the
Chief Justices and Associate Chief Justices of Canada’s superior courts.
The Canadian Judicial Council had the authority to investigate judicial
misconduct and recommend penalties up to and including removal from
57. Both Lamer C.J. and Sellar were redirecting the focus toward the harm to the white judge. “Any
white person responding to racism with an ‘I’ statement is requesting that they and their whiteness (and
delicate sensibilities) remain centered when the focus should remain on racism and its consequences
for Black citizens”: Thomas, supra note 46.
58. Sellar, supra note 56.
59. Identical wording in both the digital and printed versions: Freed, supra note 43.
60. Ibid.
61. It is true that the reporter did not repeat the hypothetical words the Chief Justice had said with
respect to his negative reference to the Roma. Did that qualify as “journalistic mugging?” The news
item was reporting on the complaint. The point the complainants were making was that, whether
hypothetical or not, such comments were harmful.
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office.62 When it was established in 1971, it was accepted that the principle
of judicial independence meant that only judges could investigate the
misconduct of other judges. The difficulties inherent in the premise were
clear in this case. The chair of the Canadian Judicial Council was none
other than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Antonio
Lamer. The judge responsible for investigating the complaint was Allan
McEachern, the white Chief Justice of British Columbia.63 Chief Justice
McEachern took the precaution of seeking an independent review from a
white Toronto lawyer.64 However, it is likely this did little to assuage the
fears of observers about the capacity of the Canadian Judicial Council to
rule on a matter concerning the top chief justice in Canada.
The complaint was dismissed in January 1998 after Chief Justice
McEachern concluded that the complaint was not serious enough to merit
further consideration, and that Chief Justice Lamer’s remarks “could not
be characterized as misconduct.” 65 He stated that Chief Justice Lamer’s
comments were “hypothetical in nature” and made in the “specific
context of a case” that concerned “matters of race and racial stereotypes
in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” McEachern emphasized that
exchanges between counsel and judges were “often wide-ranging, probing
and exploratory in nature.” 66 Lamer CJ’s hypothetical defence won the day.
The Montreal casino comments passed without further scrutiny. Although
there is a distinction between comments delivered during oral submissions
and a judicial decision, it was a light touch and a far cry from the critical
eye that was trained on Judge Sparks’ words. Given that Lamer CJ signed
the dissenting decision that was most critical of the Youth Court judge,
the gentle treatment here must have struck some observers as particularly
unsettling.

62. Canadian Judicial Council, “The work of the Council,” online: Canadian Judicial Council
<www.cjc-ccm.ca/en/what-we-do> [https://perma.cc/72CL-8YMZ].
63. Complaints were first heard by the chair or vice chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee. Due
to his position as Vice-Chair of the CJC, McEachern CJ chaired its Judicial Conduct Committee. If he
considered a complaint serious enough to merit further consideration, he could refer it to a panel of up
to five committee members who could decide whether a public inquiry was needed. Correspondence
from Jeannie Thomas, Executive Director of the CJC, to Dr. Alan Li, President of the CCNC (22
January 1998), CJC Archives File 97-120.
64. Toronto lawyer Eleanor Cronk conducted the independent review; Cronk was appointed to the
Ontario Court of Appeal in 2001.
65. Canadian Judicial Council, Annual Report 1997–1998, online: Canadian Judicial Council
<https://cjc-ccm.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_annualreport_1997-1998_en.pdf>
[https://perma.
cc/4Z4G-QYWY] at 22.
66. Canadian Judicial Council news release (23 January 1998); Correspondence from Thomas to Li,
supra note 63.
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Chief Justice McEachern claimed to “understand the sensitivities that
generated” the complaint, and regretted that the “CCNC feels aggrieved
by the statements,” but emphasized Lamer CJ’s unintentional motivation.
He noted that the “spirited argument between counsel and the Court can
sometimes create misunderstanding or cause hurt that is no less painful
for its being unintended. When this occurs, it is much to be regretted,
but judges must be free to test lawyers’ submissions with hypothetical
questions” and “to engage in frank and wide-ranging discussion.”67
McEachern CJ’s insistence that all such questions were open season,
necessary for full and frank judicial analysis, amounted to a blanket
approval of hypothetical comments—racially based or otherwise. It
failed to inquire why Chief Justice Lamer had selected these particular
hypotheticals, and what those choices might signify about his beliefs.
The Canadian Judicial Council should have delved more deeply into the
stereotypes—that Chinese people gamble, that Roma people steal, that
“ethnics” lie on the stand—asking other important questions: What is the
source of the presumption? Who is applying it? Who is it harming? It failed
to consider whether some hypothetical statements might be so offensive
they should not be used for jousting practice. According to the Canadian
Judicial Council, probing statements that contained racist stereotypes
were acceptable. Jonas Ma’s concerns that hypothetical racist stereotypes
fostered racism were dismissed.
III. The professional culture of whiteness
As white lawyers and judges, many of us live our lives primarily within a
“white bubble,” raised in families, schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces,
and social circles largely confined to white people. While insensitivity to
racism is not an inevitable consequence, for most of us the experiential
gap means that we are not well-equipped to assess racism claims. It is
impossible to know from the available records whether the nine Supreme
Court judges in the RDS case had any significant exposure to racialized
communities, but we do know that these nine judges studied in mostly
white educational institutions, they practised in predominantly white law
firms and government offices, and they sat on all-white courts.68
67. Ibid.
68. A volume of essays on Chief Justice Lamer’s life and career (b.1933, d.2007) describes personal
and professional circles that were overwhelmingly white, although one can surmise that his early
criminal defence practice in Montreal may have included some racialized clients. He studied law at
the University of Montreal, practised with Philip Cutler and Jacques Bellemare, and served as a judge
from 1969. Justice John (Jack) Major (b.1931) studied law at the University of Toronto and practised
as a corporate-commercial litigator and senior partner at the elite Alberta law firm of Bennett, Jones,
Verchere, where his clients included the Calgary Police and physicians at the Canadian Medical
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Robin DiAngelo points out that segregation may make racial disparities
“difficult for whites to see and easy to deny.”69 Although most Canadians
look with disparagement upon our American neighbours for their historic
and on-going racial segregation, many of us move within similar white
spaces without much reflection on our own situation. The Supreme Court
that heard the RDS case might itself be aptly characterized as a segregated
white space.70 Did any of the top court judges recognize that they sat on a
segregated all-white bench? If they had, would they have recognized the
implications? Describing what this means for all-white neighbourhoods,
DiAngelo explains:
Predominantly white neighbourhoods are not outside of race—they
are teeming with race. Every moment we spend in those environments
reinforces powerful aspects of the white racial frame, including a limited
worldview, a reliance on deeply problematic depictions of people of
color, comfort in segregation with no sense that there might be value
Protective Association. Justice Major had been a judge since 1991. Justice John Sopinka (b.1933,
d.1997), the first Ukrainian-Canadian on the court, studied law at the University of Toronto, and
practised with the elite Toronto firms of Faskin & Calvin and Stikeman Elliott for twenty-eight years
before moving directly from practice to the all-white Supreme Court in 1988. Justice Peter deCarteret
Cory (b.1925, d.2020) studied law at Osgoode Hall, and practised civil litigation with the Toronto firm
of Holden Murdoch while active with a number of lawyers’ professional associations. He had been a
judge since 1974. Justice Frank Iacobucci (b.1937), the first Italian-Canadian judge on the top court,
studied law at the University of British Columbia and Cambridge University, practised corporate law
at an elite New York City firm, and then joined the University of Toronto where he taught business and
tax law and rose to become Dean and Vice-President, before becoming Deputy Minister of Justice in
Ottawa. He had been a judge since 1988. Justice Gérard Vincent La Forest (b.1926) studied law at the
University of New Brunswick, Oxford, and Yale, taught law in New Brunswick, Alberta, and Ontario,
and served as Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada. He had been a judge since 1981. Justice
Charles Doherty Gonthier (b.1928, d.2009) studied law at McGill, and practised law in Montreal from
1952 to 1974, when he became a judge. Throughout his career, he remained active within lawyers’
and judges’ professional organizations. The biography of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé describes a
life and career largely devoid of non-white influences. Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin mentions in
her memoir the presence of some Indigenous people in rural Alberta where she grew up, but few nonwhite influences thereafter. Biographies of all nine judges, Supreme Court of Canada, online: <www.
scc-csc.ca> [https://perma.cc/5ZE5-GVXR]; Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds, The Sacred Fire: The
Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Chief Justice of Canada) (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2009); Lionel D
Smith, Ruled by Law: Essays in Memory of Mr. Justice John Sopinka (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000);
Sean Fine, “Supreme Court Judge Peter Cory ‘Was Legendary For His Kindness,’” Toronto Globe &
Mail (1 May 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com> [perma.cc/BZZ4-349Y]; Backhouse, supra
note 32; Beverley McLachlin, Truth Be Told: My Journey Through Life and the Law (Toronto: Simon
& Schuster, 2019).
69. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 23.
70. Two of the nine judges had been publicly acknowledged for their ethnic heritage, John Sopinka J
the first Ukrainian and Frank Iacobucci J the first Italian on the top court. Nineteenth-century Canadians
of Ukrainian and Italian backgrounds, then categorized as “racially” distinct, faced considerable
discrimination and exclusion from the classification of “white” in certain geographic areas. These
once disparaged “foreign” ethnicities had been largely integrated into the white category by the time
of Justices Sopinka and Iacobucci’s appointments in the late twentieth-century. Backhouse, supra note
12.
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in knowing people of color, and internalized superiority. In turn, our
capacity to engage constructively across racial lines becomes profoundly
limited. 71 (emphasis in the original.)

The judges’ individual interactions with police officers would also
have been mediated by their professional status as lawyers and judges. For
these judges, the risks of being street-checked, stopped and frisked, having
their homes or vehicles searched, or being wrongly arrested were minimal.
Due to his earlier stint as a criminal defence lawyer, Chief Justice Lamer
may have had greater knowledge about police wrong-doing than his
colleagues with their corporate law and civil litigation backgrounds, but
his race, class, and professional stature insulated him personally. 72 Indeed,
Lamer CJ was fond of boasting that he could speed as fast as he wished
on the highway between Ottawa and Montreal. Police cruisers would see
him driving well over the limit, come after him with their lights flashing,
catch sight of his Chief Justice of Canada licence plates, and abandon the
chase.73
In theory, ongoing judicial training that incorporated information
about racism—conscious, unconscious, individual, institutional, and
systemic—might have helped to rectify some tunnel-view perspectives.
But common law judges have traditionally been averse to judicial
education. The earliest courses, in the 1970s, were a patchwork of skills
training and doctrinal updates run by volunteer judges for the few judges
who volunteered to attend. In 1994, the Canadian Judicial Council’s
innovative recommendation for “social context” programming about
gender and race stirred up storms of controversy. Many judges insisted
that such courses could be a cover for attitudinal indoctrination by interest
groups, a violation of judicial independence. Chief Justice Lamer led the
early opposition, rejecting mandatory education, insisting that only judges
could design and deliver the material, and expressing concern that the
training must not be used “as a vehicle for indoctrination of any kind.” 74
71. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 37.
72. Michel Robert, the Chief Justice of Quebec, reflected upon Chief Justice Lamer’s law practice
in the late 1950s, stating that “with respect to police conduct towards the accused, we’ll say, to be
elegant, that it lacked monitoring.” Although Robert CJ followed up by stating that Lamer was “deeply
affected by the injustices of the system at that time,” it was an extraordinary admission, couched in an
attempt at humour, from the province’s Chief Justice. The Hon. JJ Michel Robert, “Antonio Lamer:
The Man, His Life and Times” in Dodek & Jutras, supra note 68 at 4.
73. Backhouse, supra note 32 at 339, 642.
74. Antonio Lamer, “The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in Times
of Change” (1996) 45 UNB LJ at 15; Antonio Lamer, “Social Context Education” (1997) 10 National
Judicial Institute Bulletin 1; Backhouse, supra note 32 at 505-507; Rosemary Cairns Way & T Brettel
Dawson, “Taking a Stand on Equality” in Kim Brooks ed, Judging Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s
Difference (Toronto: UBC Press, 2009) at 278-289.
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Effective social context judicial education might have gone some distance
toward lessening the “white bubble” perspectives of Lamer CJ and the
court over which he presided.
IV. The dilemma of deference
The judicial environment exacerbated the problems. The challenging task
of assessing evidence and applying legal rules requires that judges develop
a strong sense of independent self-confidence. Failure to do so can foster
uncertainty, anxiety, and incapacitation. Yet the confidence essential for
judging can also reduce recognition of personal limitations and inculcate
a sense of superiority that results in rudeness, suspicion of outsiders,
narcissism, and what some have termed “judge-itis.”
When the nine black-robed, white-tabbed RDS justices filed in from
their separate entrance to take their seats on high-backed red-leather
chairs, the court clerk shouted “All rise!” Traditional protocols hammered
home the hierarchical structures from the moment of entry. Everyone in
the room remained standing until the judges were seated on a platform
high above the rest. Lawyers bow to judges upon entering and exiting
the courtroom; they never turn their backs because doing so is deemed
disrespectful. Lawyers laugh at all the judges’ jokes, even ones that might
receive blank stares in other venues. That day Chief Justice Lamer offered
bland comments, then stopped to grin, and the audience responded with
laughter.75
Lawyers speak of “this Honourable Court.” The traditional forms of
judicial address that were in use in 1994—“My Lords and My Ladies”
—are reminiscent of peasant-serfs addressing nobility.76 When lawyers
speak, they begin with “I submit” or “We submit,” to reflect the superior
status of the judge. Observers in the courtroom suffer other restrictions.
Certain hats, clothes, and gum-chewing present expellable offences. In a
race-based case involving the prosecution of Black activist Dudley Laws in
Toronto in 1994, with a courtroom filled with Black observers, an AfricanCanadian was ordered out for refusing to remove his Muslim prayer cap.77
75. Laughter ensued even after Rocky Jones merely requested that the court “grant” the articling
clerks an opportunity to sit at the counsel table. Chief Justice Lamer said “Yes, granted,” and smirked.
Laughter then broke out. Video recording, supra note 31; Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 1.
76. When the court was established, Lord Dufferin recommended the title of “Lord Justice” to
reinforce the status of the new tribunal; James C Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court
of Canada: History of the Institution (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1985) at 23. The court website
currently recommends the title of “Justice.” online: SCC <https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qreng.aspx#f10> [https://perma.cc/7QLX-4A6F]. The RDS lawyers chose to use “My Lords and My
Ladies.”
77. Asserting his “duty to oversee the solemnity and dignity that must prevail,” the trial judge
ordered Michael Taylor, a spectator and supporter of Dudley Laws, to remove his prayer cap or
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When the overflow Black crowd in the RDS courtroom spontaneously
exclaimed “amen” when they agreed with statements made by counsel,
they were met with brusque threats of ejection.78
The obsequiousness showered on judges in court is on a different
plane from other office-holders. Rocky Jones replied to a comment by
Justice Gérard La Forest, by saying “Thank you very much, you’re so
much better than I am.” 79 Crown counsel Robert Lutes retorted “Why?” to
a question from the Chief Justice, and then jumped to add, “I don’t mean
to be flip—you know, I’m sorry. It was the heat of the moment.”80 When
the lawyers responded to the judges’ queries, they did so gently. It was
apparently unthinkable, a strategic error, to tell a judge outright that she
or he was wrong. It could risk angering the judge and damaging a client’s
case. Delicate disagreement, politely phrased, was the only recourse. 81
None of the lawyers affronted by Chief Justice Lamer’s interjections
felt they could call out the racial biases. No one pointed out that hypotheses
about gambling Chinese were part of a dreadful Canadian history of racism
—a “prevalent attitude of the day” to use Judge Sparks’ words.82 No one
suggested that hateful ideas about the Roma had long kept them from
employment, housing, and social mobility in Canada and other countries.83
As lawyer April Burey told the court, her team had been unable to find any
previous case where a judge’s decision had been appealed for racial bias.
leave the courtroom. The judge drew a distinction between Mr. Taylor’s head covering and those of
“adherents of a well established and recognizable race, culture, national or religious community.”
The Ontario Court of Appeal later ruled that the judge had erred “in suggesting that only certain
communities are clearly within the purview of the Charter.” A subsequent complaint to the Canadian
Judicial Council resulted in an expression of disapproval over the trial judge’s comments, but no
further disciplinary action. R v Laws (1998), 41 OR (3d) 499, 165 DLR (4th) 301 (CA) [Laws].
See also Rosalind Raymond, “Anti-Cop Brutality Activist Dudley Laws Wins Victory Over Police
Frame-Up,” The Militant (16 November 1998), online: <www.themilitant.com/1998/6241/6241_18.
html> [perma.cc/93FJ-TYUK]; Letter to the Editor, “Quebec Judge’s Hijab Ruling Inflammatory,”
Toronto Star (7 March 2015), online: Toronto Star <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/letters_to_the_
editors/2015/03/07/quebec-judges-hijab-ruling-inflammatory.html> [https://perma.cc/7UGM-NSJD].
78. Interview with Lynn Jones, supra note 29; Jones & Walker, supra note 26 at 203.
79. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 16.
80. Ibid at 67.
81. Backhouse, supra note 32 at chapter 35, documents a race-based case, Baker v Canada, 1999
SCC 699, [Baker], where the only Black lawyer in the Supreme Court hearing chose not to raise
relevant racism issues because he feared it would be harmful to his client.
82. Backhouse, supra note 11 at chapter 5.
83. Maureen Brosnahan, “Roma Refugees Victims of Systemic Discrimination in Canada, Report
Finds,” CBC News (2 April 2015), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/roma-refugeesvictims-of-systemic-discrimination-in-canada-new-report-finds-1.3018837> [perma.cc/J3MT2RQK]; Sean Rehaag et al, “No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in Canada” (2015)
52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ; Cynthia Levine Rasky, “‘They Didn’t Treat Me as a Gypsy’: Romani Refugees
in Toronto” (2016) 32:3 Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees at 54 citing rampant discrimination
and violence against the Roma.
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“Perhaps,” she speculated, “our difficulty arose because of the assumption
or recognition that judges make difficult decisions in good faith.” Then
she added, more directly, “Also, lawyers are schooled in deference to
judges and thus do not appeal on reasonable apprehension of bias.”84
The complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council came from social justice
organizations. As hard-hitting as it was, even the complaint never used the
word “racist.”
Hierarchical practices of deference serve as an important recognition
of the stature of judicial office and the courts, of respect for the law and
the legal system. Yet for those who experience Canadian legal institutions
as systematically unfair, these elaborate mannerisms must seem not
only quaint, but also downright problematic. Moreover, the customary
deference is not always extended to outsider members of the judiciary.
Early white female judges faced insubordination from lawyers and court
staff. 85 And prosecutor Miller interrupted Judge Sparks five times during
Rodney Small’s trial; the last intervention came in the middle of her
decision, to remind her of an earlier statement he had made.86
The legal culture of deference on full display in the Supreme Court
hearing meant that none of the lawyers confronted Chief Justice Lamer
over his racist expressions. Nor is this case anomalous. The probability is
that white Supreme Court judges have never been confronted with open
accusations of racial bias from counsel inside their courtroom. It makes
inquiries such as this one urgent, written after the fact by scholars who do
not represent clients, freer to engage in direct critique.
V. Facing the racial firing line
The final portion of this paper will examine the additional interjections
of the three judges who wrote the dissenting opinion most critical of
Judge Sparks. Unlike the majority, which upheld Judge Sparks’ acquittal
(although not without words of critique), the dissenting judges would have
sent the case back for a new trial. Justice Major wrote the dissent. Chief
Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka co-signed it. Collectively they found
84. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 48.
85. Emily Murphy, Canada’s first female police magistrate, appointed in Edmonton in 1916, was
challenged by counsel who claimed she had no jurisdiction because women were not “persons” under
the law: Byrne Hope Sanders, Emily Murphy: Crusader (Toronto: Macmillan, 1945) at 142-143.
Justice Mabel Van Camp, the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Ontario in 1971, was
refused parking in the judges’ lot by the security guard: Obituary, William Illsey Atkinson “I Am The
Damn Judge,” Globe & Mail (9 August 2012) at R5.
86. Trial Transcript, supra note 13, interruptions twice at 30, and once at 31, 50, and 80. During her
oral delivery of the decision, Judge Sparks had noted that the ride-along witness was not in court to
corroborate Stienburg’s evidence. Miller interrupted: “Your Honour, that’s the person who I advised
earlier was in the hospital and was in a coma.” “I see, okay, thank you Mr. Miller,” she replied.
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that Judge Sparks’ words raised a reasonable apprehension of racial bias
sufficient to invalidate her decision.87
Justice John (Jack) Major was the first to interrupt Rocky Jones’s
submission. Jones had stated that the allegation of bias arose because “Judge
Sparks, a Black woman, was adjudicating the trial of a Black accused
and she explicitly recognized that the case had racial overtones.” Justice
Major interjected, “Isn’t that stereotyping that seems so out of favour these
days?”88 His query exemplified a pattern that often occurs when white
racism has been identified—a condemnation of all racial assumptions.
In this case, it was a condemnation of the stereotype that a white officer
had overreacted to a Black teenager. This common response claims that
all racial stereotypes deserve condemnation as evil—that here, if it was
wrong to assume that Black teenagers were dangerous then it would also
be wrong to assume that white police overreact. DiAngelo has observed
that whites often meet a challenge of racism by insisting that assumptions
should never be drawn. “Now you are the transgressor” appears to be a
reflexive reaction.89 This constitutes an inversion that serves to destabilize
the initial claim of racism. Ijeoma Oluo describes it as a defensive attempt
“either to move the conversation to a place where the [white person] is
more comfortable, or to end the conversation completely.”90
For example, those who respond to slogans such as “Black Lives
Matter” with banners reading “All Lives Matter,” “White Lives Matter,”
and “Blue Lives Matter,” offer an instructive parallel. There are dramatic
imbalances in the number of Blacks injured and killed by police. The catchphrase is simply a way to say Black Lives Matter too; it never inserts the
word “Only” at the front. Of course, white lives matter, police lives matter,
all lives matter. But the retort sideswipes the conversation, disrupting the
focus on the immediate problem of anti-Black racism. It is also, asserts
Ibram Kendi, an illustration of an insidious pattern where claims of racism
against minority groups are met with claims of anti-white racism.91
87. While Major J, Lamer CJ, and Sopinka J’s decision did not carry the day, Justices Peter Cory and
Frank Iacobucci wrote a separate opinion holding that Judge Sparks’ remarks had been “worrisome
and came very close to the line,” but did not meet the high standard of reasonable apprehension of
bias. Because four other Justices, Beverley McLachlin, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Gérard La Forest, and
Charles Gonthier found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, Rodney Small’s acquittal
was restored. RDS, supra note 1.
88. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 5.
89. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 119-120, 128. Emphasis in the original.
90. Oluo, supra note 7 at 33.
91. Kendi, supra note 9 at 130-131: “In 2015, former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani called
the [Black Lives Matter] movement ‘inherently racist.’ …Ideas not centering white lives are [defined
as] racist. …Embattled police officers who can’t imagine losing their rights to racially profile and
brutalize respond with ‘Blue Lives Matter.’”
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Chief Justice Lamer objected that stereotypes might cause the
following:
Say, well, all young Blacks are suspect of stealing cars, and why they
steal cars is because they don’t have money, why they don’t have money
is because they don’t have jobs, and why they don’t have jobs is because
they’re Black and they’re being discriminated against. And then you
conclude, well, it’s more likely that a young non-white or Black person
or Afro-Canadian or Afro-American is going to steal a car. If a police
officer says he caught him stealing a car—I’m afraid it’s going to start
working both ways…92

There was no apparent recognition that this was exactly the situation
that many Blacks experience within the criminal justice system—with
policing, charging, prosecuting, and judging, as documented by a plethora
of studies and commissions of inquiry.93 To suggest that taking cognizance
of anti-Black racism was harmful because it might lead to white judges
exhibiting bias against Blacks was to erase the lived reality of Blacks.
Lamer CJ had set up the hypothetical under the assumption that white
judges were operating free of racial bias. As DiAngelo writes, white
defensiveness supports the “delusion that we are objective individuals,”
and protects our “deep investment in a system that benefits us and that we
have been conditioned to see as fair.”94 The erasure of white privilege also
ensures that we continue to perceive white judges as neutral and Black
judges as less so. It was no accident that the first case of judicial racial bias
to reach the Supreme Court was directed at a Black judge.
Anti-racist educators have documented patterns that distract and
deflect discussions about racism.95 Reni Eddo-Lodge notes that “the
ubiquitous politics of race…operates on its inherent invisibility.”96 The
choice of words is one signal. Ijeoma Oluo explains that we live in a society
where talking about race is “not something you ‘do’ in polite society,”
92. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 21-22.
93. AK Warner & KE Renner, “Research on the Halifax Criminal Courts: A Technical and Conceptual
Report” (1978), cited in Philip Girard, Jim Phillips & Barry Cahill, eds, The Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia, 1754–2004 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 187-188; Royal Commission on
the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1989), vol 7, Consultative
Conference Transcript of Proceedings (1989), vol 4: Discrimination against Blacks in Nova Scotia:
The Criminal Justice System: A Research Study 1989; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism
in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queens’ Printer, 1995); Report of the Aboriginal
Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991); Report of the Task Force on the Criminal
Justice System and Its Impact on Indian and Métis People of Alberta (Edmonton: Government of
Alberta, 1991).
94. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 100.
95. Oluo, supra note 7 at 209.
96. Eddo-Lodge, supra note 10 at xiv.
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and so we lack “practice in putting words to racial issues.”97 Most of us
prefer phrases such as “race relations,” “racial issues” “racial diversity,”
and “racial insensitivity” rather than the clearer term “racism.” In some
of his interjections, Chief Justice Lamer took the choice of evasive words
to extremes, referring to “an ethnic group who is disadvantaged,” and
the peculiar “racially inclined.”98 After his hypothetical about an ethnic
group without respect for the oath, the Chief Justice then redirected the
discussion away from racism entirely. With smiles and quiet chuckles—
again to general laughter—he went into a long list of the groups known
to mislead trial judges: witnesses, police officers, accused. He added
jocularly “I like to think that lawyers would mislead the court less often,”
and further, “it has been known that some judges have misled the courts,
unfortunately.”99 It was a side-tracking of the crucial debate about racism.
White fragility is marked by defensiveness over any attempt to talk
openly about race.100 The deleterious reprimand that the majority of the
RDS judges delivered to Judge Sparks and any other Black judges who
might follow her encompassed a warning that explicit reference to racist
actions would lead to censure. This is in direct opposition to the advice
of Ibram X Kendi, who insists that racism is not the worst word in the
English language. Instead he states that racism “is descriptive, and the
only way to undo racism is to consistently identify and describe it.”101
Lamer CJ’s further statement, “I don’t usually refer to people’s colour,
unless I intend to make something of it” reflects the view held by many
whites, that because racism is bad, we should insist that we do not notice
race.102 Such statements come in a variety of forms: “Race has no meaning
to me. I don’t care if you are green, purple, or polka-dot. I don’t see colour.”
Or even, as DiAngelo mentions in her American book White Fragility,
“I’m not racist, I’m from Canada.” Yet, as she notes, because historical
and current realities have placed us inside societies riven by racism, it
is “impossible to completely escape problematic racial assumptions,”
and people who claim they are not prejudiced demonstrate a “profound
lack of self-awareness.” 103 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva explains that the myth
97. Oluo, supra note 7 at 14.
98. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 11, 24.
99. Ibid at 6; Video Recording, supra note 31.
100. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 42.
101. Kendi, supra note 9 at 9, adding at 46-47, “Only Racists Shy Away From the R-word—Racism
is Steeped in Denial.”
102. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 11. Lamer did not explain what he meant by the phrase
“unless I intend to make something of it,” leaving it unclear when he thought it was correct to “make
something of it.”
103. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 4, 19, 77.
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of “colour-blindness” leads many of us to deny the unavoidable reality
of racism, and underscores our lack of understanding about what racism
is. As the first lesson of anti-racism education emphasizes, everyone has
prejudice and everyone discriminates. A racism-free perspective is an
illusion.104 Eddo-Lodge notes that “insisting that we just don’t see race…
silence[s] people of colour attempting to articulate the racism we face.”105
Kendi adds that it is ridiculous to suggest that racism will miraculously
go away if we stop identifying race. If we stop using racial categories, he
adds, “then we will not be able to identify racist policies” and the result
will be “a world of inequity none of us can see.”106
Chief Justice Lamer conceded that, while he might not be personally
implicated, it was “an obvious proposition that there is racism.” 107 Later,
he would try to reassure Rodney Small’s lawyers. “We are talking about
racism and I am very sympathetic to your argument. We are in a different
world and we are becoming a very diverse society,” he said with a
smile.108 There was no explicit recognition of the devastating legacy from
the long history of Canadian racism, just a comment that late twentiethcentury immigration had ushered in a new “diversity.” In response to the
Crown’s admission that racism existed in Canada, Justice Major was less
accommodating. “Well,” he answered, “let’s assume that it does—for the
purpose of this discussion.”109
Even supposing it did, Justice Major was not prepared to jump from
racism in Canada to Judge Sparks’ comments. He insisted that there was
“no evidence on which she could rely” that “race played a part,” other
than her own conclusions that “police officers overreact when dealing
with non-white groups.”110 Justice John Sopinka, considered Canada’s
greatest expert on the law of evidence, echoed his colleague’s insistence
that there was “no evidence.”111 Posing a slippery slope analysis, he
queried whether other judges would have to adopt Sparks’ approach:
“So that in every case a police officer, in similar circumstances, would
104. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of
Racial Inequality in America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) at 66; DiAngelo, supra
note 8 at 19-20, 68.
105. Eddo-Lodge, supra note 10 at 81, 83. Emphasis in original.
106. Kendi, supra note 9 at 54.
107. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 10-12.
108. Ibid at 23, Video Recording, supra note 31.
109. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 60-61.
110. Ibid at 5.
111. Ibid at 8. He had co-authored Sidney N Lederman & John Sopinka, The Law of Evidence in Civil
Cases (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) and John Sopinka, Sidney N Lederman & Alan W Bryant, The
Law of Evidence in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992). The latter was described as “the leading
text on the law of evidence”: McLachlin, supra note 68 at 259.
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start off with a presumption that he either overreacted or didn’t behave
properly?112 Sopinka J was hypothesizing a new reality where trial judges
would routinely frame their scrutiny of police testimony against a general
recognition about the patterns of racism in police-Black interactions. It
seems to have struck him as absurd. Yet Blacks might have retorted that
for centuries white judges had started with an implicit assumption that
police officers had no reason to lie on the stand, particularly when faced
with conflicting evidence from Black witnesses. In fact, the white Crown
prosecutor had made a similar submission at trial. Rick Miller had argued,
“[T]here’s absolutely no reason to attack the credibility of the officer. His
explanation was straight forward. He was simply doing his lawful duty
and carrying out the arrest.” 113 It may have been one of the things that
prompted Judge Sparks to issue the decision she did.114
After dismissing the wider vistas of systemic racism, Sopinka J, Lamer
CJ, and Major J shifted downward to the realm of the individual officer.
The discussion switched from whether anti-Black racism had played a
role in Rodney Small’s chokehold and arrest to questions about Officer
Stienburg: a pattern that has been described as “white-centering.”115 It was
also a cue that the three judges understood racism as discrete, isolated
acts of prejudice committed by individuals, rather than as complex,
interconnected patterns. “The question here,” Justice Sopinka emphasized,
“is whether or not [the presumption] can be applied to the particular facts
of the case?”116 Lamer CJ homed in on Officer Stienburg: “We have to
decide whether this one was racist. …But we don’t know which ones are
unless they do things to reveal it, and the smarter ones don’t.”117 Major J
asked for evidence to “show racism on the part of the police officer. Were
there events where he acted in a racist way? What is there available by
way of evidence other than things like studies which are general? What is
the value of the studies of the population in general, looking at the conduct
of a specific individual? How do you bring the results of [a] study down to
a single individual policeman? You have to show evidence that something
in his past, or somebody at the incident told it.”118
The dismissal of the value of studies into racism was particularly
surprising. The Marshall Report on the wrongful conviction of Donald
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 41.
Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 76-78.
Justice Cory suggested this; RDS, supra note 1 at 547.
Thomas, supra note 46.
Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 62.
Ibid at 10. Emphasis from the video.
Ibid at 59-61.
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Marshall, Jr. had been released only a few years earlier. In 1989, the Royal
Commission headed by three chief justices had uncovered appalling racist
treatment of an Indigenous man by the police, the lawyers, and the judges
of Nova Scotia, and also found what Nova Scotia criminologist Donald
Clairmont later described as “a long legacy of negative Police-Black
relationships in Nova Scotia.”119 The surveys the Royal Commission
conducted found Nova Scotian respondents overwhelmingly agreed that
“discrimination against blacks was an observable fact.” Both legally- and
non-legally trained respondents “expressed concern with alleged police
harassment” and reported that the police were “not very tolerant” when
dealing with young Blacks. The Report concluded that “the hostility of
many Blacks to the police, and apparently of many police toward Blacks”
was “well documented.”120
Chief Justice Lamer had even referred to the Marshall Inquiry in his
hypothetical interjections. If shocking studies like this were irrelevant in
assessing a Halifax police officer’s apparent overreaction, the requisite
standard of proof had been set impossibly high. The discussion had slipped
a long way from assessing evidence of wrongful arrest. It was as though the
police officer himself was under criminal charges for intentional racism.
Indeed, the focus had shifted far from whether the chokehold and
handcuffs on a Black teenager was an overreaction to nosey-ness,
and whether the discretionary obstruction charges were retaliation for
talking back. Instead, the judges inquired whether the officer’s intent and
119. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, vol 1, Findings and
Recommendations (December 1989) and vol 4, Discrimination against Blacks in Nova Scotia:
The Criminal Justice System, A Research Study; Don Clairmont & Ethan Kim, “Getting Past the
Gatekeepers: The Reception of Restorative Justice in the Nova Scotian Criminal Justice System”
(2013) 36:2 Dal LJ at 370. An earlier 1978 study on summary conviction first-time offenders showed
23 per cent of whites discharged and 77 per cent sentenced; none of the Blacks was discharged and
all were sentenced. Warner and Renner, supra note 93 at 187-188. Several decades later, University
of Toronto criminologist Scot Wortley’s research would document a startling over-representation of
Blacks in Halifax police street checks. Dr Scot Wortley, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Street Checks Report
(Halifax: Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, 2019). Wortley concluded: “The police are much
more likely to level criminal charges against Blacks for lower-level criminal events. Young people
will defy or question an officer, and the officer will use force and say they were threatened. We call
it ‘contempt of cop’ situations. Then [the young Blacks] face discretionary charges such as obstruct
justice, assault police.” Interview with Scot Wortley (28 November 2019) in Toronto. See also Report
on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: December 1995); Report of
the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991); Report of the Task Force
on the Criminal Justice System and Its Impact on Indian and Métis People of Alberta (Edmonton:
Government of Alberta, 1991); Clayton James Mosher, Discrimination and Denial: Systemic Racism
in Ontario’s Legal and Criminal Justice Systems, 1892-1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1998); David M Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin, 2006);
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives (Blackpoint, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 2017).
120. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, supra note 119 at 17, 26, 49-50.
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motivation were based on race.121 They had failed to grasp that the issue
was not whether the individual officer had racist motivations but whether
he misperceived the dangers and risks connected with Rodney Small.
Research has demonstrated that whites perceive danger simply because
of the presence of Black people, and that “we cannot trust our perceptions
when it comes to race and crime.”122 Had the cultural and social perceptions
of the police magnified the threat of an unarmed fifteen-year-old on a
bike into a potentially injurious assault on a SWAT team officer? Had the
cultural and social perceptions of white judges done the same?
Justice Sopinka even suggested that Judge Sparks had a responsibility
to canvas other valid reasons for police overreaction: “[S]he doesn’t try
to find some legitimate explanation. …[W]hy would this person [Officer
Stienburg]—what would this person’s motive be to lie?”123 The word “lie”
had never appeared in Judge Sparks’ decision. She said: “I’m not saying
that the Constable has misled the Court,” and “I believe that probably the
situation in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who
overreacted.”124 The job of a trial judge is to determine whether the Crown
has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Sparks did not need
to find the officer had lied, and she did not. Sopinka’s jump to questioning
the officer’s motive to “lie” was an over-attribution, another reflection of
white defensiveness.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Lamer’s comment that “bias is never fair”
may be a comforting thought, but it is premised upon the invisibility of
pernicious biases that we all labour under, most of them tied to prevailing
realities that position the races on unequal planes. 125 The lessons that can
be drawn from scrutinizing the appellate judges’ ideas here are ones that
all of us need to incorporate if we aspire to disabuse ourselves of racist
notions. The judges’ interjections and questions in the RDS case reveal
much about white judicial thinking. Their informal conversation offers an
instructive comparison with Judge Sparks’ carefully worded comments
121. Oluo, supra note 7 at 89: The focus on individual officers denies the existence of systemic racism.
“[I]nstead of a system plagued by unchecked implicit bias, inadequate training, lack of accountability,
racist quotas, cultural insensitivity, lack of diversity, and lack of transparency, we are told we have
a collection of individuals doing their best to serve and protect outside of a few bad applies acting
completely on their own, and there’s nothing we can do about it other than address those bad apples
once it’s been thoroughly proven that the officer in question is indeed a bad apple.” Chris Rock added
that law enforcement was among the professions that “simply could not allow” bad apples: “American
Airlines can’t be like, ‘You know, most of our pilots like to land; we just got a few bad apples that like
to crash in the mountains.’” Itzkoff, supra note 49.
122. DiAngelo, supra note 8 at 45.
123. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 8. Emphasis added.
124. Trial Transcript, supra note 13 at 92-93.
125. Appeal Transcript, supra note 2 at 70.
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in her oral decision. Canada’s first Black female judge found her words
under harsh dissection and reprimand from a majority of Supreme Court
judges whose own words received significantly different treatment.

